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THE CONSUMER IN CROSS-BORDER 
PASSING OFF CASES 
Graeme W Austin* 
This article considers Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group [2015] UKSC 31 in 
which the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that, for the purposes of the passing off tort, 
goodwill is strictly territorial. It compares this approach with that of New Zealand cases which have 
adopted a more flexible approach to the protection of goodwill in the cross-border context. The 
article suggests that, in some cases, the New Zealand approach will be better adapted to consumer 
experience in the modern international marketplace. 
I INTRODUCTION 
While the consumer is central to the tort of passing off, we cannot peer into the minds of all the 
actual consumers who have been or might be misled by a defendant's conduct. 1  Instead, our 
understanding of the consumer is shaped by legal doctrines and forensic imperatives. For example, 
to succeed in a passing off case, the plaintiff must show that there is confusion among a "substantial 
number" of the public.2 Decisions therefore need to be made about the number of consumers that 
  
*  Chair in Private Law, Victoria University of Wellington; Professor of Law, Melbourne University. The 
author is grateful for the extensive comments on and critique of an earlier draft of this article by the expert 
participants in the New Zealand Private Law Roundtable, especially from Bill Atkin, Nicole Moreham and 
Andrew Robertson, and for the excellent research assistance provided by Scott Fletcher, LLB(Hons) 
student, Victoria University of Wellington. This article also draws from material presented by the author at 
the Trademark Scholars' Roundtable at Oxford University in June 2015. 
1  In essence, the tort of passing off is directed at firms' wrongful representations that their goods are the goods 
of somebody else: Frank Reddaway Ltd v Banham [1986] AC 199 (HL) at 204. Passing off commonly 
occurs when consumers are, or are likely to be, misled into purchasing the wrong thing: AG Spalding & 
Bros v AW Gamage Ltd [1914–1915] All ER 147 (HL) [AG Spalding] at 149 and Erven Warnick v Townend 
[1979] AC 731 [Erven Warnick] at 739–740. Liability for passing off can also occur when the source 
identifying function of a firm's get-up or other indicia of origin are diluted in consumers' minds: Taylor Bros 
Ltd v Taylors Group Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 1 (CA) at 37: "in some cases it is legitimate to infer damage from a 
tendency to impair distinctiveness". 
2  Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] RPC 341 (HL) at 407 per Lord Oliver; Neutrogena 
Corporation v Golden Ltd [1996] RPC 473 (EWCA).  
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will satisfy this standard, and the kind of evidence that will be admitted.3 The picture of the 
consumer is especially faintly drawn in the context of interim relief – where, often for good reason, 
little evidence might be available.4  Where there is direct evidence that consumers have been 
confused, courts have become increasingly concerned about its scalability. 5  Even the phrase 
"calculated to deceive", used by Lord Parker in the first clear statement of the elements of the tort,6 
invites a degree of speculation as to how consumers will actually respond to the defendant's 
actions.7 
In passing off doctrine, the "consumer" is thus an abstraction.8 The picture of the consumer 
emerges from a kind of inchoate empiricism; its contours are shaped partly by facts, partly by 
hunches, partly by judicial experience and partly by doctrinal parameters. Analysis of passing off 
jurisprudence might therefore usefully include consideration of how passing off doctrine 
understands or constructs the notion of the consumer. This area of inquiry has become particularly 
  
3  On the admissibility of survey evidence in trademark cases see Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer plc [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1501, [2013] 2 All ER 663 [Interflora]; and Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984] 
RPC 293 (EWCA).  
4  See Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 (CA), setting out 
requirements for interim injunction. 
5  See Premier Luggage and Bags v Premier Co [2002] EWCA Civ 387, [2003] FSR 5 (EWCA), observing 
that the trial judge accorded too much weight to a single instance of confusion; and Arnotts Ltd v Trade 
Practices Commission [1990] FCA 473, 97 ALR 555, questioning the utility of survey evidence based on 
population sampling. 
6  AG Spalding, above n 1, at 149. An earlier classic statement of the requirements is in Leather Cloth 
Company v American Leather Cloth Company (Ltd) (1865) 11 HL Cas 523 at 538: "The fundamental rule 
is, that one man has no right to put off his goods for sale as the goods of a rival trader, and he cannot 
therefore (in the language of Lord Langdale in the case of Perry v Truefitt (6 Beav 66), 'be allowed to use 
names, marks, letters or other indicia, by which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods which 
he is selling are the manufacture of another person.'" 
7  Christopher Wadlow The Law of Passing Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (3rd ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2004) at 8. For instance, in the pharmaceutical labelling context, the public interest in 
safety might be relevant to a court's analysis of the likelihood that consumers will be deceived or confused 
by the defendant's representations: see Win-Medicare Pvt Ltd v Galpha Laboratories Ltd High Court New 
Delhi, 4 January 2016, IA Nos 22711/2014 & 26365/2014 in CS(OS) No 3507/2014.  
8  The construction of the consumer in this sense has become an important theme in United States trademark 
scholarship: see for example Devan Desai "From Trademarks to Brands" (2012) 64 Fla L Rev 981; Laura 
Heymann "The Birth of The Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law" (2005) 80 Notre 
Dame L Rev 1377; Laura Heymann "The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law" (2008) 52 St Louis 
University Law Journal 781; and Graeme W Austin "Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination" (2004) 69 
Brook L Rev 827. In United States' federal trademark law, there is almost a complete alignment between 
analysis of the likelihood of confusion in the contexts of passing off and infringement of registered 
trademarks. 
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salient in the light of the trend in cognate jurisdictions to limit the role of empirical evidence about 
consumer confusion in litigated cases.9 
Taking these ideas as its springboard, this article focuses on the 2015 decision in Starbucks 
(HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group.10 There, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
held that a Hong Kong firm could not enjoin the actions of another firm in the United Kingdom 
based merely on the Hong Kong firm's reputation within the United Kingdom. The trial judge had 
found that there were United Kingdom residents who knew about the claimants' television 
programmes through exposure to YouTube videos and on demand in-flight entertainment systems.11 
The Supreme Court held, however, that reputation within the United Kingdom was insufficient: 
only United Kingdom customers would suffice for the purposes of passing off. Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Lord Neuberger, President, reasoned that the claimants therefore lacked a 
protectable property interest.  
In this aspect, the "hard line" approach, as Lord Neuberger characterised it, differs from that 
adopted by courts in a number of other common law jurisdictions. New Zealand and Australian 
courts have adopted a less rigid approach.12 In Conagra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd, 
  
9  In the trademark infringement context, for example, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has recently 
held that survey evidence is "generally of little or no value": Interflora, above n 3, at [135]–[141]. See also 
Kate Swain and others "Surveying Trade Mark Surveys" Managing Intellectual Property (online ed, 
February 2013) at 49. New Zealand courts have thus far adopted a more pragmatic approach to the 
admissibility of survey evidence, taking the view that the weight to be accorded to such evidence is a  matter 
for the court: Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332 (HC) [Levi Strauss] at 364. 
Occasionally, surveys might be criticised for asking the wrong kinds of questions: see for example 
Mainland Products Ltd v Bonlac Foods (NZ) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 341 at 350 (CA), criticising a telephone 
survey in the context of a case turning on a visual comparison). In some instances, a survey might be 
admitted, but accorded relatively little weight: see Patience & Nicholson (NZ) Ltd v Cyclone Hardware Pty 
Ltd [2001] 3 NZLR 490 (HC) [Patience & Nicholson] at [90]–[91]. New Zealand courts have not yet 
engaged with the approach of the English courts to survey evidence. In Intercity Group (NZ) Ltd v 
Nakedbus NZ Ltd [2014] NZHC 124, [2014] 3 NZLR 177 at [123], Asher J discussed a later stage of the 
Interflora litigation in-depth, but did not discuss the Court of Appeal's reservations as to admissibility. This 
was, however, in a context in which the survey evidence was regarded as highly probative. Recently, in 
Commerce Commission v New Zealand Nutritionals (2004) Ltd [2016] NZHC 832, in a claim under the Fair 
Trading Act 1986 (FTA), the absence of survey evidence was held not to be fatal to the Commerce 
Commission’s claim.  In Tasman Insulation New Zealand Ltd v Knauf Insulation Ltd [2015] NZCA 602, 
[2016] 3 NZLR 145 at [254], in the context of a claim under the FTA, the Court of Appeal also resisted 
attacks on survey evidence, and considered  it to reinforce the Court’s own impression as to the meaning 
conveyed by the mark at issue. 
10  Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group [2015] UKSC 31, [2015] All ER 469 [Starbucks 
(SC)]. 
11  At [5]. 
12  As have several other common law jurisdictions: Caterham Car Sales & Coachworks Ltd v Birkin Cars 
(Pty) Ltd [1998] 3 All SA 175 (Supreme Court of South Africa); Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc [2013] SGCA 65, [2014] 1 SLR 911 (Singapore Court of 
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Lockhart and French JJ held that it sufficed for the plaintiff to establish a reputation in the 
jurisdiction.13 Neither a physical business presence in the jurisdiction nor a place of business was 
required. On this analysis, those who might be harmed by the defendant's actions need not be 
"customers". Similarly, in the New Zealand High Court, Eichelbaum J held in Midas International 
Corporation v Midas Autocare Ltd that it was sufficient in an interlocutory injunction application 
for the plaintiff to rely on evidence that it had a considerable reputation in its field, both in its home 
country (the United States) and Australia.14 His Honour observed that though the plaintiff had not 
traded in New Zealand its reputation would be known to New Zealanders who had seen advertising 
in material circulating in New Zealand and to those who had become of aware of the plaintiff's 
operation by reason of travel overseas. 15  Were it necessary to establish that the plaintiff had 
business activity within New Zealand, his Honour considered that its negotiations for the 
establishment of a franchise would have sufficed.16  
In Dominion Rent A Car Ltd v Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal adopted a more radical approach, holding that a firm's goodwill could transcend 
international boundaries and that, for some trans-Tasman businesses, it would be artificial, for the 
purposes of passing off, to divide a firm's goodwill into separate Australian and New Zealand 
bundles of rights.17 In a 2013 New Zealand High Court decision, Toogood J referred to Cooke P’s 
analysis in Dominion Rent A Car and opined: "In 2013, it can hardly be doubted that New Zealand 
and Australia may, for the purposes of enforcing intellectual property rights, be regarded as one 
  
Appeal) [Staywell]; N R Dongre v Whirlpool Corporation [1996] SCR 5 Supp 569 (Supreme Court of 
India); and Mac Personal Care Pvt Ltd v Laverna Gmbh and Co 28 January 2016 FAO (OS) 194/2015 
(High Court of Delhi).  
13  ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 (FCAFC) [Conagra] at 341–342. In the 
same case, Gummow J reasoned that it sufficed for the plaintiff to establish a reputation with a substantial 
number of persons who would be potential customers if the plaintiff established a business within the 
jurisdiction; ConAgra at 353. See also Fletcher Challenge Ltd v Fletcher Challenge Pty Ltd and Ors [1981] 
1 NSWLR 196 (NSWSC). 
14  Midas International Corporation v Midas Autocare Ltd (1987) 2 TCLR 491 (HC) [Midas] at 498. 
15  At 498. 
16  At 498. See also Gallaher Ltd v International Brands Ltd (1977) 1 NZIPR 43 (SC). 
17  Dominion Rent A Car Ltd v Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 395 (CA) [Dominion 
Rent A Car] at 406. See also Crusader Oil NL v Crusader Minerals NZ Ltd (1984) 3 IPR 171 (HC); and 
Patience & Nicholson, above n 9, at [32]: "Undoubtedly the forces of closer economic relations between 
Australia and New Zealand and of globalisation generally mean that there will be increasing opportunities 
to see that spilling over of reputation." 
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market".18 In turn, that analysis was adopted obiter by Woolford J in 2015, again in the High 
Court.19 
Starbucks raises a number of technical points about the territorial scope of goodwill that may be 
of considerable importance for firms seeking to roll out their products and services on an 
international scale.20 As will be explained below, the distinction between territorially confined and 
cross-border conceptions of goodwill also exposes different conceptions of the consumer. The 
contrast between the New Zealand and United Kingdom case law provides an opportunity to 
consider which of these approaches better accommodates the consumer worldview in the 
contemporary markets for goods and services,21 especially markets for the kinds of weightless 
goods that now traverse international borders with relative ease. 22  It also raises a number of 
intriguing questions about the relationship between private property, territoriality, and the sovereign 
power of the nation state. The more prosaic doctrinal question posed by Starbucks is whether the 
New Zealand approach remains sustainable. This article suggests that the Starbucks analysis is not 
sufficiently compelling to warrant a departure from the New Zealand position on the protection of 
goodwill across borders. 
II THE STARBUCKS DECISION  
The Starbucks claimants ran a Hong Kong-based television business that marketed its services 
under the mark "NOW". Within Hong Kong, the claimants had acquired a substantial goodwill in 
  
18  Muzz Buzz Franchising Pty Ltd v JB Holdings (2010) Ltd [2013] NZHC 1599 at [74]. 
19  Dreamtech Designs and Productions Pty Ltd v Clownfish Entertainment Ltd [2015] NZHC 1143 
[Dreamtech] at [49]. 
20  Graeme W Austin "Introduction: the Inevitability of 'Territoriality Challenges' in Trademark Law" in Irene 
Calboli and Edward Lee (eds) Trademark Protection and Territoriality Challenges in a Global Economy 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014) at 1–2. 
21  As the United Kingdom Supreme Court's analysis suggests, it is possible to identify differences between the 
Australian and New Zealand approaches. Lord Neuberger's reasoning suggested that Dominion Rent A Car's 
holding that there be goodwill in New Zealand, even if shared between Australia and New Zealand, did not 
support the Hong Kong entity's case, whereas that case was supported by the Australian courts' willingness 
to recognise a local reputation as sufficient for the purposes of passing off: Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at 
[41]–[42]. See also Stephen Todd "Interference with Intellectual Property" in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of 
Torts in New Zealand (7th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2016) at 763–764. As the discussion of 
Midas, above n 14, indicates however, there are New Zealand cases that have adopted a more relaxed 
approach to the interest protected by passing off, one more in line with the approach in ConAgra. For the 
purposes of this article, it is assumed that, in practical terms, little may turn on this distinction. What might 
seem like cross-border goodwill through one lens might seem more like local reputation that is protected by 
passing off through another. 
22  Here, the comments of Eichelbaum J in Midas, above n 14, at 497 seem prescient: "having regard to the 
diminishing importance of international boundaries in the face of the communication explosion I see 
attraction in an even less demanding approach to the requirement of proof of goodwill".  
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that name. By 2012, the claimants' company was Hong Kong's largest TV operator, with subscribers 
in nearly half of all Hong Kong households. While consumers outside of Hong Kong could not 
access the claimants' pay TV channel, the firm had nevertheless established a reputation among 
some viewers outside of Hong Kong, including in the United Kingdom. It operated its own 
YouTube channel, and had made some of their Chinese language television programmes available 
through internationally accessible websites. A number of airlines had made the claimants' "NOW" 
television programmes available through video-on-demand in-flight services.23  
The dispute arose when the defendants, which were part of the Sky Broadcasting Group, 
announced in 2012 that they were planning to launch their own Internet television pay-per-view 
service in the United Kingdom under the name "NOW TV". The claimants initiated proceedings for 
passing off and infringement of its Community trade mark (CTM) in the NOW mark.24 The trial 
court dismissed the CTM action, holding the mark to be invalid or, alternatively, not infringed.25 
Accordingly, the claimants could only be protected by way of its common law rights in its goodwill. 
The Court held, however, that the claimants' reputation in the United Kingdom was an insufficient 
foundation for a passing off action. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals on both issues.26 The 
Supreme Court granted leave only on the passing off point.  
The Starbucks holding rests on two propositions. First, goodwill is territorial, meaning that 
goodwill exists and is protected on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.27 Accordingly, a firm doing 
business in country X and country Y has two distinct bundles of property rights, one protected under 
the law of X and the other under the law of Y. Secondly, the territorial limitations on goodwill mean 
that it is only customers within the jurisdiction who count for the purposes of establishing whether 
goodwill exists. The trial judge had held that the claimants' United Kingdom reputation was more 
than de minimis.28 But because the claimants in Starbucks lacked United Kingdom customers, the 
English law of passing off could not help. 
  
23  The facts are recounted in detail in the first instance decision Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Group Plc [2012] EWHC 3073 (Ch) [Starbucks (HC)] at [18]–[49]. 
24  Regulation 40/1994 on the Community Trade Mark [1994] OJ L11/1. This created trade marks which are 
governed by a uniform Community law directly applicable in all member states. 
25  Starbucks (HC), above n 23, at [15]–[116], and [120]–[121]. As to validity, the Court held that the NOW 
mark was precluded from registration on the basis that it would be regarded by the average consumer as a 
description of a characteristic of the television service, namely its immediate availability. As to 
infringement, the differences between the figurative elements of the claimant's mark and those of the 
defendant's mark would have dispelled confusion. 
26  Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1465, [2014] FSR 20.  
27  See Wadlow, above n 7, at 154 ff. 
28  Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at [10]. 
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In support of the first proposition, the Supreme Court adopted the analysis of the Privy Council 
in the famous 1976 decision in Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor, an appeal from the Court of 
Appeal of Singapore.29 In Yap Kwee Kor, Lord Diplock set forth the classic statement on the 
territoriality of goodwill, reasoning that goodwill "is local in character and divisible: if the business 
is carried on in several countries a separate goodwill attaches to it in each".30 Several years before 
the dispute arose, the plaintiff (coincidentally, another Hong Kong firm) had abandoned the 
Singapore market, when Singapore ceased to be a free port. The Privy Council held that the plaintiff 
could not bring a passing off action to enjoin the defendant's activities in Singapore. For the 
purposes of passing off, the Hong Kong business was separate from any Singaporean business. 
Accordingly, any goodwill it might have in Hong Kong was irrelevant to the existence of goodwill 
within Singapore. The Privy Council held that the Hong Kong business and accompanying goodwill 
did not provide the basis for a cause of action for passing off within Singapore. 
The second proposition can be illustrated by a number of earlier authorities holding that 
protection under the tort of passing off requires customers within the jurisdiction, not merely 
reputation. In Alain Bernardin et Compagnie v Pavilion Properties Limited, for example, 
Pennycuick J declined to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain a firm from using the name 
"Crazy Horse Saloon" on the application of a firm that had established a reputation in Paris under 
the same name.31  Because the plaintiff had not offered any restaurant services in the United 
Kingdom, it could not rely on the passing off tort. Pennycuick J held "with reluctance" that the 
plaintiff did not have a prima facie case for an injunction, observing that the defendant was "cashing 
in" on the plaintiff's reputation and had deliberately copied the plaintiff's trade get-up.32 A number 
of other cases similarly reasoned that the territorial nature of goodwill requires trade within the 
jurisdiction, not merely reputation.33 
  
29  Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor [1976] FSR 256 (PC). 
30  At 269. 
31  Alain Bernardin et Compagnie v Pavilion Properties Limited [1967] FSR 341 (Ch). 
32  At 350. 
33  Amway Corporation v Eurway International Ltd [1974] RPC 82 (Ch); and Athlete's Foot Marketing 
Associates Inc v Cobra Sports Ltd [1980] RPC 343 (Ch). Of course, firms that own registered trademarks 
might be able to rely on rules that protect famous marks that exist in foreign jurisdictions. In broad outline, 
such marks are protected when they have a sufficient reputation within the jurisdiction in which protection 
is sought: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (opened for signature September 28 
1979, entered into force June 3 1984), art 6bis. Also, under the Paris Convention, art 4, all registered 
trademarks, even those lacking sufficient fame enjoy a six-month priority in the registration context. 
However, under the Starbucks (SC) analysis, a firm seeking to rely on passing off alone must show 
customers within the jurisdiction. Their Lordships also invoked the limited protections afforded to famous 
marks in international law (in essence, the Paris Convention limits these obligations to marks that have 
achieve fame) in support of the hard line approach to territoriality: Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at [64].  
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A key aspect of the motivation behind the Supreme Court's approach is made clear by its 
discussion of barriers to market entry for domestic firms. The Court was especially concerned 
that:34 
… a claimant could shut off the use of a mark in this jurisdiction even though it had no customers or 
business here, and had not spent any time or money in developing a market here – and did not even 
intend to do so.  
Clearance costs are higher where indicia of origin can be protected both by the registered trademark 
system and by passing off. The costs of the former involve a search of the register, which, in 
jurisdictions that have efficient trademark registration systems, can be relatively low.35 Searches for 
unregistered pre-existing indicia of origin (such as can be protected through passing off) are more 
costly, and involve scrutinising the branding and marketing strategies adopted by other firms in the 
same market context, including material that has not been registered. Insisting that foreign firms 
spend time or money within the jurisdiction before they will protected by passing off can be 
understood as a filtering device that limits the number of firms whose activities needed to be 
considered by a new market entrant. Foreign firms with a reputation, but no customer base, need not 
be considered.36 In sum, limiting the factual inquiry in this way makes it cheaper for local firms to 
get to market.  
More generally, the hard line approach should limit the scope of the factual inquiry in any case. 
It is axiomatic that goodwill must be established as a matter of fact: this is the key difference 
  
34  Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at [63]. 
35  In some jurisdictions there is also a "Supplemental Register" which, whilst not providing rights in marks, 
acts as a signal to potential competitors that a firm has some reputation in the relevant mark. See for 
example Lanham Act 15 USC § 1051–1056. 
36  This reasoning implies that requiring customers within the jurisdiction can be explained as a kind of quid 
pro quo: protectable rights are a reward for investment. In the era of cross-border marketing, however, 
having a business within the jurisdiction no longer means investment of the bricks and mortar kind. Indeed, 
at a number of points in the Supreme Court's judgment, and in those of the courts below, it is implied that 
targeting customers within the jurisdiction might be enough. Frequently invoked as a condition for 
exercising personal jurisdiction, targeting in the relevant sense can involve a fairly minimal investment, and 
certainly no physical presence: factors include the currency in which purchases can be made, the relevance 
of advertising on the website to consumers within the jurisdiction, and so on: Case C-173/11 Football 
Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2012] ECR C-242 at [41]. Accordingly, the kind of investment that might 
justify recognition of property in goodwill is not necessarily for the general benefit of the population. 
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between passing off and an action for infringement of a registered trademark.37 According to Lord 
Fraser's formulation in Erven Warninck BV v J Townend Sons (Hull) Ltd a plaintiff must establish:38  
(1) that his business consists of, or includes, selling in England a class of goods to which the particular 
trade name applies; (2) that the class of goods is clearly defined, and that in the minds of the public, or a 
section of the public, in England, the trade name distinguishes that class from other similar goods; (3) 
that because of the reputation of the goods, there is goodwill attached to the name; (4) that he, the 
plaintiff, as a member of the class of those who sell the goods, is the owner of goodwill in England 
which is of substantial value; (5) that he has suffered, or is really likely to suffer, substantial damage to 
his property in the goodwill by reason of the defendants selling goods which are falsely described by the 
trade name to which the goodwill is attached. 
Starbucks concerned the application of the fourth element: what must be shown to establish that 
the plaintiff is the owner of goodwill within the jurisdiction in respect of which relief is sought. The 
Starbucks holding treats as irrelevant any business activity outside of the jurisdiction – and, 
concomitantly, any reputation within the jurisdiction that is not accompanied by local customers or, 
at the very least, advertising expenditure. In line with Lord Neuberger's emphasis on enhancing 
legal certainty, insisting on customers within the jurisdiction will presumably allow courts to filter 
out a number of cases before reaching the more indeterminate inquiry as to consumer impressions of 
a foreign firm's reputation.39 
III  CONSUMER WORLDVIEWS 
For all the efficiency advantages of certainty as to the metes and bounds of property rights, it is 
helpful to remember that firms' interests are not the only interests at stake in the context of legal 
claims that protect firms' goodwill. Such claims are typically explained as providing protections for 
the interests of both firms and their customers.40 Certainly, prohibitions against passing off help 
firms to internalise their investment in quality, which would be more difficult to do if other firms 
  
37  See for example Trade Marks Act 2002, s 17(1). In Dominion Rent A Car, above n 17, at 420, Somers J 
observed: "In the end the question of the existence and extent of reputation and of goodwill must be a matter 
of fact". See also Unicorn Products Ltd v Roban Jigg & Tool Company (UK) Ltd [1976] FSR 169 (EWHC) 
at 178, where the Court stated it is for the plaintiff to establish "that goodwill has in fact been created". 
38  Erven Warninck, above n 1, at 755–756. 
39  Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at [49]. 
40  Levi Strauss, above n 9, at 361–362. See in contrast Registrar of Trademarks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 
1020, (1999) 93 FCR 365 at [47], where, in a discussion by an Australian judge of the purposes of trade 
mark law, French J noted that, given the rise of consumer protection statutes, trade mark law might be more 
focused on the rights and interests of firms. See also Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd  
[2000] HCA 12, (2000) 202 CLR 45 at [42], discussing the inherent tension between different interests of 
consumers and traders.  
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could freely adopt the indicia of origin that symbolise a firm's goodwill.41 At the same time, 
consumers have an interest in not being misled. Without prohibitions on free riding, consumers 
would find it more difficult to find the goods or services they want. Protecting goodwill represented 
by indicia of origin thus facilitates competition in consumer markets.42 Firms' interests in calibrating 
their investment in quality thus align with consumer interests in being able to find the goods and 
services they want.  
What does the segregation of goodwill along geopolitical lines suggest about the consumer 
worldview? Most obviously, the Court's holding implies that consumers' understanding and interests 
can, and should, also categorised along jurisdictional boundaries. The doctrine implies that the same 
person might be the plaintiff's customer within Hong Kong, but, within the United Kingdom, merely 
somebody who knows about the plaintiff's brand. Whether that knowledge might have led to a 
consumer thinking that there is a connection between the foreign brand and the local market entrant 
is legally irrelevant. The legal principle adopted in Starbucks seems to superimpose upon 
consumers' world views the synthetic boundaries of the nation state.43 
Acknowledging the necessarily abstracted character of the consumer in passing off does not 
render real consumer experiences entirely irrelevant. It remains helpful to ask whether that 
abstraction aligns at all with the realities of consumers' apprehension of firms' branding messages. 
Empirical studies suggest that this is likely to be a highly contextualised inquiry, and that it is 
impossible to generalise about consumers' sense of place in the context of firms' branding strategies. 
For example, despite an increasingly globalised market for goods and services, or perhaps because 
of it, many marketing campaigns continue to play on the notion of nationalism.44 These campaigns 
  
41  Qualitex Company v Jacobsen Products Company Inc 514 US 159 (1995) at 160: "The law … discourages 
those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability to quickly evaluate the 
item offered for sale" (citations omitted). Note that in United States trade mark law passing off and 
infringement of registered rights are, for relevant purposes, largely assimilated. The United States Supreme 
Court has, in addition, noted that the purpose of trade marks is to "protect the public so that it may be 
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favourably knows, it will get 
the product it asks for and wants to get": Two Pesos Inc v Taco Cabana Inc 505 US 763 (1992) at 782 per 
Stevens J.  
42  William M Landes and Richard A Posner "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective" (1987) 30 Journal of 
Law and Economics 265 at 285.  
43  The concept of "synthetic jurisdiction" is discussed in detail by Richard Ford in "Law's Territory (A History 
of Jurisdiction)" (1999) 97 Mich L Rev 843. The boundaries are of synthetic jurisdictions are arbitrary vis-
à-vis the people governed within in them. The boundaries of synthetic jurisdictions are determined and 
bureaucratically policed in order to achieve an independent political or legal purpose – for example, 
achieving a functioning democracy, in the case of electoral districts. In other contexts, these purposes might 
be efficient taxation or rating systems, allocation of educational resources through school zoning, and 
delivery of services, and other concerns of bureaucratic convenience. 
44  Steven Jackson "Globalization, corporate nationalism and masculinity in Canada: Molson beer advertising 
and consumer citizenship" (2014) 17 Sport in Society 901. 
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seek to capitalise on the idea of the nation state as a source of collective identification, and entrench 
notions of place.45 Other studies have shown that local populations might have an acute awareness 
of the particular national source of foreign-origin goods. 46  And many studies suggest that 
consumers continue to have strong views about the connection between quality and national 
origin.47 The rise in the importance of geographical indications also reflects the importance of place 
in some consumer contexts.  
At the same time, in many marketing contexts, to insist on a strictly territorial sense of place is 
increasingly artificial. Today, many trademarks seem to be at once from everywhere and nowhere. 
The components of the iPhone, for instance, come from seven different countries. 48 Since the 
breakup of national broadcasting monopolies, consumers now have a far greater variety of 
weightless goods – such as audio-visual products – available to them.49 Many of these products can 
go globally viral in short order.  
Assessing the alignment of the consumer as it is understood in the doctrine and the reality of 
consumer experiences might provide a useful lens for assessing the relative merits of the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand approaches. For instance, the New Zealand approach affords greater 
scope for the possibility that consumers might receive branding messages from a variety of sources, 
both from within the jurisdiction in which they are resident, and beyond. It also allows scope for the 
possibility that those branding messages might be relevant to the risk of consumer deception and 
that, in some contexts, consumers do not necessarily conceive of the goodwill of a business as being 
tethered within geopolitical borders. Of course, in the Australia/New Zealand context, it will not 
necessarily follow that a cross-border goodwill will be established as a matter of fact. As the Court 
of Appeal has noted, it is not inevitable that, in the trans-Tasman context, there will be a single 
goodwill. It will depend on the facts of the particular situation.50 Even so, the New Zealand case law 
at least allows scope for that possibility. In contrast, the Starbucks holding, with its segregation of 
  
45  At 909. 
46  See for example Stigler and others "Westernization and tobacco use among young people in Delhi, India" 
(2010) 71 Social Science and Medicine 891, discussing a well-documented trend in developing nations in 
which goods sourced from the United States and other developed countries are considered to accord status 
to the purchasers. 
47  Leila Hamzaoui and Dwight Merunka "The impact of country of design and country of manufacture on 
consumer perceptions of bi-national products' quality: an empirical model based on the concept of fit" 
(2006) 23 Journal of Consumer Marketing 145 at 145–146. 
48  Ram Ganeshan "The iPhone 4 Supply Chain" (28 November 2010) Operations Buzz <www.operations 
buzz.com>. 
49  Jean K Chalaby "The making of an entertainment revolution: How the TV format trade became a global 
industry" (2011) 26 European Journal of Communications 293 at 293–294. 
50  Dominion Rent A Car, above n 17, at 401. See also Dreamtech, above n 19, at [49].  
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product goodwill along geo-political boundaries, precludes an alignment of the doctrine with 
consumer understanding of branding messages in almost all contexts. 
The premise on which the hard line approach is based – that there is a separate Hong Kong 
goodwill, a separate United Kingdom goodwill, and so on – thus further diminishes the importance 
of consumers in the analysis. In contrast, the Dominion Rent A Car approach allows the conception 
of goodwill to be informed more by consumers' understanding. In some trans-Tasman contexts, for 
example, it might be more artificial to assume that consumers do not think in trans-Tasman terms. In 
applying the passing off tort, it seems excessively formalistic to assume that, in all contexts, 
consumers' understanding of indicia of origin exists within geopolitical silos that correspond with 
nations' borders. It is an approach that might, in some contexts, focus attention on how businesses 
actually interact with their customers, and what customers actually understand. Put simply, free-
riding on another firm's local reputation, even if that firm does not have customers within the 
jurisdiction, might, in some instances, cause consumer confusion. 
IV  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TERRITORY 
Consideration of the relationship between territory and product goodwill also exposes deeper 
questions about the connection between private property, governmental power, and territorial 
jurisdiction. Passing off is premised on the idea that the interest protected is property in goodwill. 
We are now so used to the idea of territoriality of property rights that it is difficult to imagine 
alternative conceptions.51 On the orthodox view, the link between territorial authority and property, 
between imperium and dominium, implies that private property rights can only be animated within 
the jurisdiction by the sovereign that exercises power over the relevant territory. 52 The strong 
conceptual connections that exist between private property and public power might also make the 
underlying logic of the Starbucks case appear inevitable. 
This is partly why the idea advanced by Cooke P in Dominion Rent A Car that firms might own 
a trans-Tasman goodwill seems so radical. With its suggestion that there can be "trans-Tasman" 
property rights in goodwill, Dominion Rent A Car cuts right across these ideas. Cooke P's analysis 
points in the direction of other concepts of jurisdictional authority – concepts that do not necessarily 
rely on geopolitical boundaries and the connection between property and sovereignty.  
  
51  Ford, above n 43, at 843: "We are now accustomed to territorial jurisdiction – so much that it is hard to 
imagine that government could be organized any other way" (emphasis in original). 
52  In the trademark context, two famous United States Supreme Court cases illustrate the point: Hanover Star 
Milling Company v Metcalf 240 US 403 (1916); and United Drug Co v Theodore Rectanus Co 248 US 90 
(1918). In broad outline, these cases held that trademark rights depend on use: rights within a particular 
state only arise as a business crosses state lines. A corollary of this point is that the laws of the individual 
states animate the property rights at issue.  
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Territorial authority has, however, never been the sole way of organising thinking about 
jurisdiction. For example, the phenomenon of "borderland communities" that straddle different 
nation states is well documented.53 In earlier times, the migratory paths of animal herds were 
probably far more relevant to jurisdiction than borders between nation states. Recent sociological 
work focuses on the rise of the international city whose interests perhaps more closely align with 
those of the city itself as much as with the wider national polity.54 And, as many cities become 
super diverse in their population make-up, understandings of citizenship might become increasingly 
complex, with allegiances pulling in different directions, to the city, the nation state, and places of 
origin. 55  In the Aotearoa/New Zealand context, for many Māori who are resident within the 
Commonwealth of Australia iwi (tribal) affiliations continue to be very salient as sources of 
authority and identity.56 
Goodwill might be an especially appropriate context in which to countenance the kind of 
loosening of property from the nation state – the radical premise that seems to inform the Dominion 
Rent A Car idea of cross-border goodwill. Goodwill, as it is understood in the context of passing off, 
is a kind of "psychological property".57 The strength of source identifying indicia of origin of course 
depends on factors that are within a firm's control – advertising expenditure and market penetration. 
But it also depends on consumers' appreciation of those branding messages. It is not too much of an 
overstatement to suggest that goodwill is "all in the mind".58  
Property in unregistered marks and get-up does not depend on local trademark registers, 
established and run by government agencies, for its existence. Nor does this kind of property have a 
situs that is comparable to the situs of tangible property. Goodwill – at least in the passing off 
context – is a kind of property that is not obviously connected to the nation state, unless, of course, 
it is defined in a way that reinstates those connections, by conditioning its existence on customers 
within the jurisdiction. If the strength of goodwill depends on what goes on in consumers' minds, it 
seems to be an especially private kind of property – possibly the closest we get in the modern polity 
  
53  Claudia Sadowski-Smith (ed) Globalization On The Line: Culture, Capital, and Citizenship at US Borders 
(Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002). 
54  The path-breaking work of Professor Saskia Sassen is prominently associated with the concept of the global 
city. See for example Saskia Sassen The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1991). 
55  Paul Spoonley and Catherine Taiapa Sport and Cultural Diversity: Responding to the Sports and Leisure 
Needs of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in Auckland: report prepared for the Auckland Regional 
Physical Activity and Sport Strategy (Massey University, Auckland, 2009) at 10–16. 
56  Paul Hamer Māori in Australia: Ngā Māori i te Ao Moemoeā (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2007). 
57  Graeme Austin "Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair Use" (2008) 50 
Arizona L Rev 157 at 173–174. 
58  At 167. 
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to pre-legal property. Accordingly, when delineating the characteristics of goodwill in the context of 
passing off, it might well be appropriate to think that the consumer is as, if not more, sovereign as 
the nation state.59 Moreover, as discussed above, the Dominion Rent A Car analysis offers the 
possibility of a better alignment between this understanding of goodwill and consumers' interest in 
not being deceived. 
V  DOCTRINAL ISSUES 
Turning to traditional doctrinal concerns, a closer look at the Starbucks case reveals a number of 
reasons why its logic might not be regarded as inexorable. Parts of its own doctrinal analysis are 
perhaps not as compelling as might first appear. For example, the Supreme Court drew support for 
its hard line approach from the Court of Appeal's decision in Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky 
Budvar NP, a well-known case that also concerned the territorial scope of goodwill.60 In Anheuser-
Busch, the Court of Appeal confronted the issue of the existence of Anheuser's goodwill within the 
United Kingdom. Anheuser-Busch was one skirmish in the ongoing battle between Anheuser-Busch, 
the manufacturer of the hugely successful Budweiser brand of beer (known in the United States as 
the "King of Beers"), and a Czechoslovakian company that exported beer in bottles bearing labels 
on which the words "Budweiser Budvar" were prominently displayed.61 Anheuser had engaged in 
only limited marketing of its beer, principally to United States personnel at military bases located in 
the United Kingdom and to United Kingdom residents employed at the bases. Residents of the 
United Kingdom might also have been exposed to the brand at United States Embassy social 
functions. As Oliver LJ observed in the leading judgment, no ordinary consumers could have 
purchased the Budweiser branded beer in the United Kingdom. Sporadic business activity was not, 
the Court held, a sufficient basis for a passing off action. The exposure of United Kingdom residents 
to the brand was merely an extension of Anheuser's United States channels of trade, and was not a 
sufficient basis for establishing a separate United Kingdom goodwill. 
The Supreme Court characterised the ratio of Anheuser-Busch as follows: "indisputably … in 
order to support a passing off claim, the claimant must establish goodwill in the form of customers 
for its goods or services within the jurisdiction".62 To be sure, in Anheuser-Busch, Oliver LJ took no 
  
59  This concept of "consumer sovereignty" is discussed in detail in Don Slater Consumer Culture and 
Modernity (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997); and George Stigler and Gary Becker "De Gustibus Non Est 
Disputandum" (1977) 67 The American Economic Review 76. 
60  Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar NP [1984] FSR 413 (CA) [Anheuser] at 464.  
61  The battle between these two interests has played out in a number of jurisdictions, and has even been the 
subject of a claim to the European Court of Human Rights, under the property clause in the 1st Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights: Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) 44 EHRR 42 (ECHR). 
62  Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at [26]. 
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issue with the fundamental point that goodwill is territorial, describing Lord Diplock's analysis in 
Yap Kwee Kor as beyond dispute.63 But Oliver LJ also noted that:64 
… the question, to which no very clear answer emerges from the authorities, is what form of activity on 
the part of the plaintiff is required before it can be said that he has a 'business' here to which goodwill 
can attach?  
In other words, determining what is relevant to establishing goodwill as a matter of fact is a 
different question from whether goodwill is territorial. Anheuser-Busch might thus be read as 
holding simply that the plaintiff's limited penetration of the United Kingdom market was an 
insufficient basis on which to sustain a passing off action. This is a narrower basis than the 
suggestion that reputation within the jurisdiction can never be a protectable interest for the purposes 
of passing off. In its analysis of Anheuser-Busch, the Supreme Court thus conflates two issues. It is 
one thing to say that Anheuser-Busch had no customers within the jurisdiction outside of military 
and diplomatic circles and, for that reason, it had no protectable United Kingdom goodwill. It is 
quite different to say that the existence of customers within the jurisdiction is the only way that a 
plaintiff can establish the existence of the goodwill that it seeks to protect through the passing off 
action. Put simply, Anheuser-Busch does not necessarily preclude a more expansive approach to 
protectable goodwill – one that is at least consistent with that adopted in leading Australian and 
New Zealand cases. 
Secondly, the hard line might transpire to be a little blurrier than the Court suggests. In the 
following passage, the Court discussed what having customers in the jurisdiction might mean:65 
As to what amounts to a sufficient business to amount to goodwill, it seems clear that mere reputation is 
not enough… The claimant must show that it has a significant goodwill, in the form of customers, in the 
jurisdiction, but it is not necessary that the claimant actually has an establishment or office in this 
country. In order to establish goodwill, the claimant must have customers within the jurisdiction, as 
opposed to people in the jurisdiction who happen to be customers elsewhere. Thus, where the claimant 's 
business is carried on abroad, it is not enough for a claimant to show that there are people in this 
jurisdiction who happen to be its customers when they are abroad. However, it could be enough if the 
claimant could show that there were people in this jurisdiction who, by booking with, or purchasing 
from, an entity in this country, obtained the right to receive the claimant's service abroad. And, in such a 
case, the entity need not be a part or branch of the claimant: it can be someone acting for or on behalf of 
the claimant. 
  
63  Anheuser, above n 60, at 464: "The principle here enunciated by Lord Diplock is not, and indeed cannot 
very well be, disputed." 
64  At 465. 
65  Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at [52]. 
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As the passage indicates, the necessary showing of a business with customers can be achieved in 
a variety of ways. To take another example, in Sheraton Corp of America v Sheraton Motels Ltd 
Buckley J held that there was a sufficiently arguable case that a United States hotel chain had a 
protectable goodwill in the United Kingdom when it had London booking agents that enabled 
potential customers to book a room in one of the plaintiff's United States hotels. 66  Indirect 
marketing that accompanies a service marketed through an advertising supported website might also 
qualify.67 And in a prominent New Zealand case, an interim injunction was granted on the basis of 
local publicity, advertising and contacts.68 As these cases attest, there is a range of different ways 
that firms expand their business across borders. The difficulty of tying down the interest protected 
by passing off might also provide a basis for questioning whether the hard line approach is well 
adapted to the modern marketplace. 
Relatedly, the Supreme Court reserved its position on cases involving extensive advertising 
campaigns foreshadowing imminent market entry in the jurisdiction in which protection is sought. 
There is Singaporean authority to the effect that in such circumstances, protectable goodwill 
exists.69 There is also an early Chancery decision adopting the contrary position, which the Court 
declined to overrule.70  Lord Neuberger explained that for such activity to be characterised as 
goodwill within the jurisdiction it would need to be regarded as an exception to, rather than an 
extension of, the hard line approach. Such an exception, Lord Neuberger explained, would need to 
be justified by "commercial fairness rather than principle".71 The Court preferred to confront the 
issue when a decision on the point was required.72 In future cases, it will inevitably be asked 
whether commercial fairness might justify other kinds of departure from the hard line approach.73 
  
66  Sheraton Corp of America v Sheraton Motels Ltd [1964] RPC 202 (EWHC). 
67  At [67]. This point appears to acknowledge that, like the payment of the purchase price for a product, 
consumers' attention also has a monetary value: Barak Orbach "Indirect Free Riding on the Wheels of 
Commerce: Dual-Use Technologies and Copyright Liability" (2008) 57 Emory LJ 409. 
68  Esanda Ltd v Esanda Finance Ltd [1984] 2 NZLR 748 (HC) at 750–751. 
69  Staywell, above n 12. 
70  Maxwell v Hogg (1867) LR 2 Ch App 307. 
71  Starbucks (SC), above n 10, at [66]. 
72  The principle's blurriness is also suggested by the Court's use of the term "business". "Business" is not a 
term of legal art. Its meaning is shaped by context. For a business to exist, paying customers are not 
necessarily indispensable; nor is third party advertising. Consider an internationally-available website at 
which beta versions of a new video game can be played without charge. The game is promoted under a 
distinctive name. The game developer hopes eventually to attract players and to derive income, either 
through advertising or through purchased game enhancements. However, at the early stage of the roll out, 
the game developer firm is not sure where it might find customers and so has not invested in targeting 
specific jurisdictions. Delimiting the protectable interest in a passing off action to paying customers would 
put such sites at a significant disadvantage in the passing off context, compared with a firm that did charge 
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Thirdly, there are also cases in which a departure from a strictly territorial view has been 
permitted, so as to prevent those free riding on others' goodwill from using indicia of origin as 
instruments of fraud. A prominent example is John Walker & Sons Ltd v Henry Ost & Co Ltd.74 In 
this case an injunction was granted in favour of various blenders and exporters of Scotch whisky, 
restraining the defendants from selling in Ecuador a mixture of Scottish single malt whisky and a 
local cane spirit. The second defendant added the cane spirit to the Scotch Whisky and intended that 
the whisky be admixed and described as Scotch Whisky, and the first defendant knew that the 
second defendant would do so.75 The underlying claim might be rationalised as a tort committed 
within the jurisdiction,76 or in terms of broader equitable duty not to allow instruments of fraud to 
pass into the stream of commerce.77  
These kinds of doctrinal considerations suggest that the certainty promised by the hard line 
approach might transpire to be more illusory than real. Taken together, they would support a view 
that departure from the New Zealand approach is not necessarily warranted. 
VI  CONCLUSION 
In 1984, Jeffries J observed that a strictly territorial approach to passing off "does not 
necessarily provide a solution for us". 78  This brief article advances a few reasons why this 
evaluation continues to have force. A hard line territorial approach to goodwill risks entrenching an 
  
for downloads of the games. Furthermore, other kinds of entity, such as charities, do not have customers in 
the traditional sense, yet the goodwill of charitable entities has been protected by the tort of passing off: see 
British Diabetic Association v The Diabetic Society [1996] FSR 1 (HC); and Dr Barnardo's Homes v 
Barnardo Amalgamated Industries [1949] 66 RPC 103 (HC). In the cross-border context, the implications 
of the Starbucks (SC) holding for charities can be illustrated by the example of Medecins Sans Frontiers. 
While it is hardly appropriate to describe this entity as running a business or as having customers, it has a 
considerable reputation, including in jurisdictions such as New Zealand that are not specifically targeted 
through its websites. Many New Zealanders who are exposed to foreign media are, however, likely to know 
of its activities. There could be a significant risk of confusion by potential donors if another entity attempted 
to pass itself off as the original entity. 
73  For example, Cooke P's analysis in Dominion Rent A Car is also informed by a concern with commercial 
fairness. For example, he opined that as a consequence of the internationalisation of trade the possibility of 
confusion of names tends to increase; nevertheless "it would be inequitable to refuse to allow traders to use 
similar names, adopted bona fide in the territories where their respective businesses began": Dominion Rent 
A Car, above n 17, at 406. 
74  John Walker & Sons Ltd v Henry Ost & Co Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 917 (EWHC) [John Walker]. 
75  At 923–924. 
76  At 933–934. 
77  Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] 1 AC 133 (HL) at 145. See also 
British Telecommunications Plc & Ors v One In A Million Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 1272, [1999] 1 WLR 903. 
78  Crusader Oil NL v Crusader Minerals NZ Ltd (1984) 3 IPR 171 (HC) at 181. 
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artificial conception of the consumer – a conception that does not accommodate the possibility that 
consumers' understanding of the messages communicated by indicia of origin do not always align 
with geopolitical borders. While it might be awkward to conceive of property rights straddling two 
(or, perhaps, more) sovereign territories, the close nexus between goodwill and consumer 
perceptions might justify this departure from orthodoxy. And, if that idea seems too radical, a viable 
alternative is to recognise that consumers will, in some instances, be appropriately protected if 
reputation within the jurisdiction is considered a sufficient basis for invoking the passing off tort. 
When the opportunity arises, it should be expected that a New Zealand court might be urged to 
follow the Starbucks holding. Standing against that suggestion are carefully reasoned New Zealand 
cases whose approaches to passing off in cross-border contexts are well adapted to some consumers' 
experiences in trans-Tasman markets. Even beyond the trans-Tasman context, as consumer 
experiences becomes more international, the softer New Zealand line might transpire to be more 
future-proofed than the hard line approach adopted in Starbucks. Cross-border passing off cases 
might be another area where reasonable minds can disagree, and New Zealand courts consider it 
best that we continue along our own path. 
